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IT'S MY BODY AND I'LL DIE IF I WANT TO: A
PROPERTY-BASED ARGUMENT IN
SUPPORT OF ASSISTED SUICIDE
I AM NOT AN ADVOCATE FOR FREQUENT CHANGES
IN LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS. BUT LAWS AND IN-
STITUTIONS MUST GO HAND IN HAND WITH THE
PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND. AS THAT BE-
COMES MORE DEVELOPED, MORE ENLIGHTENED,
AS NEW DISCOVERIES ARE MADE, NEW TRUTHS DIS-
COVERED AND MANNERS AND OPINIONS CHANGE,
WITH THE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, INSTITU-
TIONS MUST ADVANCE ALSO TO KEEP PACE WITH
THE TIMES. WE MIGHT AS WELL REQUIRE A MAN TO
WEAR STILL THE COAT WHICH FITIED HIM WHEN A
BOY AS CIVILIZED SOCIETY TO REMAIN EVER
UNDER THE REGIMEN OF THEIR BARBAROUS
ANCESTORS.'
Does the United States Constitution encompass a right to die? The
Supreme Court has ruled in the affirmative-there is at least a limited
right to die.2 Just how far does this right go? May a person refuse poten-
tially lifesaving medical treatment? The Court has answered this with a
resounding "yes." 3 May a patient discontinue treatment currently under-
way? Again, the Court has answered in the affirmative.4
Refusal of lifesaving medical treatment and discontinuance of life-pro-
longing medical treatment surely hastens one's death where it might
1. Inscription on Thomas Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C. (quoting Thomas
Jefferson) [hereinafter Inscription].
2. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277 (1990). "This is the
first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue whether the United
States Constitution grants what is in common parlance referred to as a 'right to die."' Id.
"The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id. at
278.
3. "[T]he common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encom-
passing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment." Id. at 277. "IFor
purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a compe-
tent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."
Id. at 279.
4. See id. at 271-80.
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otherwise be avoided for a period of time-often for years. So why, then,
do laws and institutions draw a line where someone wishes to hasten his
or her own death outside the context of lifesaving or life-prolonging med-
ical treatment? American law is willing to accept suicide and attempted
suicide without imposing criminal penalties.5 However, when a person
assists in a suicide, society is unwilling to let the act go unpunished.6
This Comment will examine the ethical and legal treatment of suicide
and assisted suicide, and will develop an argument in support of assisted
suicide. Part I of this Comment will provide a brief historical overview of
the legal ramifications of suicide and assisted suicide. Part II will review
recent statutory developments in the area of assisted suicide. Part III will
analyze the development of the constitutional "right to die." Part IV will
discuss cases in which individuals have attempted to expand the right to
die into a right to assisted suicide, and the failure of such arguments to
persuade the courts. Part V will develop and discuss an alternative argu-
ment in support of assisted suicide, based on property rights in one's own
body. This Comment will define property and then demonstrate how
one's body fits within this definition. This Comment will undertake a
moral and legal analysis of the body as property and conclude that be-
cause one's body is his or her property, suicide and assisted suicide are
within one's legal and moral rights.
I. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF SUICIDE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE-PAST
AND PRESENT
"Under the common law, suicide was murder,"7 and committing sui-
5. People v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Mich. App.) (Shelton, J., dissenting),
vacated and remanded, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Hobbins v.
Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995) (neither suicide nor attempted suicide is currently a crime in
any American state).
6. The majority of American states have laws that impose criminal penalties on per-
sons who assist others to commit suicide. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (citing George P. Smith,
II, All's Well That Ends WelL Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely En-
lightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 275, 290-91 n.106 (1989) (compiling
statutes)) [hereinafter All's Well That Ends Well]. "Thirty-two states explicitly criminalize
assisted suicide; 11 more states treat it as a crime [of murder] under common law." Brad
Knickerbocker, Oregon's Suicide Measure Draws Hippocratic Fire, CnIsTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Nov. 14, 1994, at Al, A8 [hereinafter Oregon's Suicide Measure].
7. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d at 295 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring)). "Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any
reasonable creature in being, in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or afore-
thought, either express or implied." I& (quoting People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980)).
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cide resulted in "criminal liabilities and harsh penalties."' Currently,
however, neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime in any one of
the United States. 9 Suicide was decriminalized, "not because the act does
not fall within the definition of murder, but because no punishment is
provided for self-murder.""0 Under the common law, assisting a suicide
also fell within the definition of murder.1 However, the enactment of
laws specifically barring assisted suicide12 has eliminated the need for its
inclusion in the common law definition of murder.1 3 If probable cause
exists to believe a person's death was the direct result of a defendant's
act, the defendant can be properly charged with murder. 4 But where a
person is involved only in the events leading up to another person's sui-
cide, such as providing the means, the defendant can only be charged
with assisting in a suicide.' If suicide and attempted suicide are no
longer considered criminal,' 6 how can it be that assisting a person to com-
plete a noncriminal act can itself be criminal? 17 "It is logically incompre-
hensible that a person can be charged with a capital crime of aiding and
abetting a lawful act."'"
8. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487,493 (Mich. App.), affd in part and
rev'd in part, People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied sub nora.
Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995). The punishment for committing suicide under
the common law included "forfeiture of all property and burial in the highway with a stake
through the deceased's body." Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d at 295 n.3.
9. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d at 298 (Shelton, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 295. The punishment that was provided for suicide (self-murder) under the
common law is no longer practiced because it is inappropriate. Id. at 295 n.3.
11. See Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 738.
12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. See Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 738 ("[W]e would overrule Roberts to the extent
that it can be read to support the view that the common-law definition of murder encom-
passes the act of intentionally providing the means by which a person commits suicide.")
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 739 n.71 ("Suicide is, by definition, the killing of oneself.
Our analysis recognizes a distinction between killing oneself and being killed by another.
Because suicide is not murder and is no longer viewed as criminal, assisting suicide is its
own species of crime.") (citation omitted).
14. IdL at 738.
15. Id. at 738-39.
16. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d at 298.
17. "The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which is widely regarded as the
greatest criminal law reform project of this century, criminalizes aiding or soliciting an-
other to commit suicide, but does not criminalize suicide or attempted suicide." Id. at 295
(citation omitted).
18. Id. at 298 (Shelton, J., dissenting); see All's Well That Ends Well, supra note 6, at
307. According to Professor George P. Smith:
The social and religious standards that hold suicide immoral prevent the law from
dealing forthrightly with the dilemma. The law's resolution allows one to commit
suicide legally, yet prohibits aid by another in completing the act. This "old-fash-
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II. RECENT STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS IN ASSISTED SUICIDE
In recent years, the citizens of Washington, California, and Oregon
voted on proposals to legalize physician-assisted suicide.19 In 1991, the
citizens of Washington voted on Initiative 119, which would have allowed
physicians to legally assist in a patient's suicide and to legally engage in
voluntary active euthanasia.20 The results of the election were close-
forty-six percent in favor, fifty-four percent against.2 ' In 1992, California
voted on a similar proposal, Proposition 161, which was also defeated by
the same margin.22
Oregon is the only state that has enacted an assisted suicide initiative.23
However, following the narrow passage of Oregon Ballot Measure 16 in
ioned" manner of thinking devalues enlightened acts of self-determination for
perceived theological harmony. This presents untold problems for incurably dis-
abled but competent individuals who desperately need assistance in ending their
travail with a semblance of dignity and compassion.
Id (citation omitted).
19. See Martin Gunderson & David J. Mayo, Altruism and Physician Assisted Death,
18 J. MED. & PHn. 281, 281 (1993) (discussing Washington and California); Albert R.
Jonsen, Living With Euthanasia: A Futuristic Scenario, 18 J. MED. & PHL.. 241,241 (1993)
(discussing Washington and California); Major Events in Movemen" Significant Events in
the Right-to-Die Movement, THE ARIz. REPUBLIC, May 13, 1995. at A22 [hereinafter Major
Events in Movement] (discussing Washington, California. and Oregon); Oregon's Suicide
Measure, supra note 6, at Al (discussing Washington, California. and Oregon).
20. See sources cited supra note 19. Physician-assisted suicide "occurs where the phy-
sician gives the patient the means to commit suicide." Gunderson & Mayo, supra note 19,
at 292 n.1. For example, "giving the patient a prescription for barbiturates which the pa-
tient could use to kill himself or herself." Id. at 281. Voluntary active euthanasia "occurs
where the doctor does the killing." Id. at 292 n.1. An example of voluntary active eutha-
nasia is the administering of a lethal injection. Id. at 281 (footnote omitted).
21. Major Events in Movement, supra note 19, at A22; Oregon's Suicide Measure,
supra note 6, at A8.
22. Major Events in Movement, supra note 19, at A22; Oregon's Suicide Measure,
supra note 6, at A8. It is interesting that both the Washington and California measures
were defeated by the same margin-eight percentage points. Defeat of the two measures
occurred despite preelection polls indicating that most people in Washington and Califor-
nia favored the measures. Id.
23. See Oregon's Suicide Measure, supra note 6, at Al. Oregon Ballot Measure 16,
The Oregon Death With Dignity Act, provides in part:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal dis-
ease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a writ-
ten request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane
and dignified manner in accordance with this Act.
The Oregon Death With Dignity Act § 2.01 (1994), reprinted in OFFICIAL 1994 GENERAL
ELECTION VOTER'S PAMPHLET-STATEWIDE MEASURES.
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1994,1 a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction preventing Oregon
from putting the law into effect until a determination could be made as to
its constitutionality.' The same judge has since issued a permanent in-
junction based upon his determination that the law violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution.26
Today, no state grants its citizens the right to commit assisted suicide.27
One may end his or her own life by committing suicide, but one cannot
engage others to assist them in doing so. 2 8 Therefore, one's control in
this respect is dependent upon the ability to act for one's self.29 What
then does an individual do when he or she is unable to act indepen-
dently-such as in the case of a person who is a quadriplegic, a person
with advanced multiple sclerosis, or an individual who is comatose or in a
persistent vegetative state-yet the person has made it clear that, under
such circumstances, he or she wishes to end his or her life?30 This ques-
tion has led to the development of "right to die" jurisprudence.
24. Measure 16 passed with a 52% majority vote. Oregon's Suicide Measure, supra
note 6, at Al.
25. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1502-03 (D. Or. 1994) (preliminary injunction),
later proceeding, 891 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Or.), mot. ruled upon, claim dismissed, summ. ju~lg-
ment granted, in part, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or.), injunction granted, 891 F. Supp. 1439 (D.
Or. 1995); U.S. Judge Bars Assisted Suicide Law in Oregon, WASH. PosT, Dec. 28, 1994, at
A7.
26. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437. "Measure 16 provides a means to commit suicide to a
severely overinclusive class who may be competent, incompetent, unduly influenced or
abused by others. The state interest and the disparate treatment are not rationally related
and Measure 16, therefore, violates the Constitution of the United States." lId (footnote
omitted); Judge Strikes Down Oregon's Suicide Law, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at A15.
27. It appears that many Americans currently favor such a right. But one must keep in
mind that opinions and attitudes on the issue of assisted suicide fluctuate with the times.
In 1982, a national poll indicated that 68% of Americans favored legal access to physician-
assisted suicide. George P. Smith, H, Reviving the Swan, Extending the Curse of Methusela,
or Adhering to the Kevorkian Ethic?, 2 CAMBRIDOE Q. oF HEALTHCARE ETmcs 49, 50
(1993) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Reviving the Swan]. A decade later, in the Washing-
ton and California elections, only 46% of voters supported access to physician-assisted
suicide, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, despite preelection polls indicating
that most people in those states favored the measures, Oregon's Suicide Measure, supra
note 6, at A8. In December 1993, a national poll indicated that 73% of those surveyed
favored legal access to physician-assisted suicide. Id. In November 1994, the citizens of
Oregon voted in favor of such a right by a 52% majority. Id. at Al. Then in 1995, 12 states
introduced legislation aimed at legalizing physician-assisted suicide. Major Events in
Movement, supra note 19, at A22.
28. LAw, HEALTH & MmnicAL REGULATION 39 (Sally Wheeler & Shaun McVeigh
eds., 1992).
29. Id
30. See All's Well That Ends Well, supra note 6, at 307.
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT TO DIE"
A. In re Quinlan
In re Quinlan3l is "generally regarded as the landmark decision con-
cerning the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. ' '32 In re Quinlan
involved a request by the father of a comatose young woman, Karen Ann
Quinlan, to be designated the guardian of his daughter and her prop-
erty.33 The father asserted that such guardianship, if granted, should pro-
vide him the power to "authorize the discontinuance of all extraordinary
medical procedures allegedly sustaining Karen's vital processes and
hence her life, since these measures... present[ed] no hope of her even-
tual recovery. 3 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that:
If... there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging
from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient
state, the present life-support system may be withdrawn and
said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefor
on the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hos-
pital or others.35
According to the court, a comatose individual has a right to privacy
protected by the United States Constitution "to be free from bodily inva-
sion by further treatment (a respirator), that the right was not diminished
by her mental incompetency, and that her father could refuse such treat-
ment on her behalf. 3 16
After Quinlan, many courts permitted or would permit withholding or
withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from either incompetent or
competent individuals based upon rights grounded in the common law
right to informed consent or in a constitutional right to privacy.
3 7
31. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
32. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714,725 n.28 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.
Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995) (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647).
33. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 672.
36. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 725 n.28. In 1976, when Karen Ann Quinlan was 22, she
was removed from her respirator. Joyce Wadler, Karen Ann Quinlan: A Family's Faith,
WASH. PosT, May 26, 1981, at Al. However, long after Karen was removed from her
respirator, her comatose life continued. Id. Tragically, Karen Ann Quinlan, whose name
became synonymous with both "death with dignity" and a patient's right to die, remained
alive but comatose for ten years after artificial respiration was discontinued. See All's Well
That Ends Well, supra note 6, at 385.
37. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271-77 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (rights of privacy and informed consent permit
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Although many courts have found a right to refuse medical treatment
through a generalized right to privacy, the United States Supreme Court
has not.38
B. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health39 was the first case
to present the United States Supreme Court with the issue of whether the
Constitution grants a "right to die."4 In Cruzan, the Court was asked to
determine the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that restricted a
couple from ending "the artificial nutrition and hydration of their brain-
damaged daughter, absent clear and convincing evidence of her
wishes."'" The Court upheld the Missouri statute4 2 and observed, "The
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
our prior decisions., 43 However, the narrow question in Cruzan related
withholding chemotherapy from profoundly retarded 67-year-old man suffering from leu-
kemia); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (right to refuse
treatment adequately supported by the informed consent doctrine); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209 (N.J. 1985) (right to self-determination and informed consent permit removal of naso-
gastric feeding tube from 84-year-old incompetent nursing home resident suffering irre-
versible mental and physical ailments); In re Conservatorship of Drabick. 245 Cal. Rptr.
840, cerL denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988) (right to refuse treatment grounded in common law
and constitutional right to privacy incorporated into state probate statute permitting re-
moval, at request of conservator, of nasogastric feeding tube from 44-year-old man in per-
sistent vegetative state); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (II1. 1989) (doctrine of
informed consent permits discontinuance of artificial nutrition and hydration of 76-year-
old woman rendered incompetent from a series of strokes); McConnell v. Beverly Enter-
prises-Connecticut, Inc., 553 A2d 596 (Conn. 1989) (right to withdraw artificial nutrition
and hydration found in state statute based on common law and constitutional rights of self-
determination)); see also id. at 275 n.5 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. Rptr. 297
(Cal. App. 1986) ("competent 28-year-old quadriplegic had right to removal of nasogastric
feeding tube inserted against her will"); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal.
App. 1984) ("competent 70-year-old, seriously ill man had right to the removal of respira-
tor"); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. App. 1983) ("physicians could not
be prosecuted for homicide on account of removing respirator and intravenous feeding
tubes of patient in persistent vegetative state")).
38. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7.
39. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
40. Id. at 277.
41. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 725 (Mich. 1994), cerl. denied sub nom.
Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
42. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284 ("In sum, we conclude that a State may apply a clear and
convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutri-
tion and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state.").
43. Id at 278 (emphasis added).
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to an incompetent brain-damaged patient." For purposes of the case,
though, the Court "assume[d] that the United States Constitution would
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse life-
saving hydration and nutrition."45 The United States Supreme Court
couched this right in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest,
rather than as a generalized right of privacy as many state and lower fed-
eral courts have done.46
The Court in Cruzan held that when an incompetent patient's guardian
seeks to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment on behalf of the patient,
the state has a legitimate right to demand clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's desire to terminate treatment.47 However, regardless of
the evidentiary burden required in the case of an incompetent person,48
the Court found a general right to refuse treatment-a "right to die"-
based upon the patient's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests.
49
IV. EXTENSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT TO DIE" TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. Compassion in Dying v. Washington
In May 1994, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Washington decided the case of Compassion in Dying v. Washington.5
At the time the case arose, Washington had no legal prohibition on
either suicide or attempted suicide.51 However, Washington did have a
law banning both aiding and causing the suicide of another.5 2 In Com-
passion in Dying, a case of first impression, the district court was asked to
44. Id. at 265 ("Nancy Beth Cruzan was rendered incompetent as a result of severe
injuries sustained during an automobile accident .... She ha[s] virtually no chance of
recovering her cognitive faculties.").
45. Id. at 279.
46. Id. at 279 n.7.
47. Id. at 263 ("Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of
this choice [between life and death] through the imposition of heightened evidentiary re-
quirements."). K.G. Biagi, Moore v. Regents of the University of California:" Patients, Prop-
erty Rights, and Public Policy, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 433,452 (1991) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 263); "The state's interest in preserving life permits it to place the burden of an errone-
ous decision to refuse medical treatment on the individuals seeking to terminate life-sus-
taining treatment." Id. at 452 n.154.
48. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
49. See id. at 279 n.7.
50. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g, en banc,
granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
51. Id. at 1458.
52. Id.
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rule on the constitutionality of Washington's crininal prohibition against
physician-assisted suicide.5 3 The plaintiffs asserted that mentally compe-
tent, terminally ill adults have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
that extends to a personal choice to commit physician-assisted suicide.54
The plaintiffs argued that such individuals have a right protected by the
Constitution to be free from undue governmental interference with their
personal decision to hasten death, and thereby avoid prolonged suffer-
ing.55 Relying on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey56 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Healthy the district court held that competent, terminally ill adults have
a constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to hasten their
death by committing physician-assisted suicide.58 The district court de-
clared the Washington law unconstitutional because of the undue burden
it placed on the exercise of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 59
The district court found the reasoning in Casey "highly instructive and
almost prescriptive '60 on the issue of what liberty interest may exist in
the choice made by a terminally ill person to commit suicide. 61 Following
the reasoning in Casey, the court explained that this case concerns mat-
ters that involve intimate and personal choices that are central to one's
personal dignity and autonomy, and central to the liberty interests pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 62
In addition, the district court also found Cruzan "instructive." 63 On
Cruzan the court wrote:
53. If. at 1455-56.
54. Id at 1459.
55. Id.
56. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
57. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
58. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462.
59. Id at 1467.
60. Id at 1459.
61. Id The issue in Casey involved a woman's right to choose abortion, and did not
address the issue of the liberty interest that may attach to a terminally ill person's choice to
commit suicide. Id. However, the district court in Compassion in Dying relied on Casey
for assistance in defining the somewhat abstract concept of "liberty" as applied to the issue
of assisted suicide: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State." Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807
(1992)).
62. Id
63. Id at 1461.
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This court is confident that, squarely faced with the issue, the
Supreme Court would reaffirm Justice Rehnquist's tentative
conclusion in Cruzan that a competent person has a protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, even
when that treatment is life-sustaining and refusal or withdrawal
of the treatment would mean certain death.'
The court then questioned whether the Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest recognizes a difference between refusal of unwanted medical
treatment which will inevitably result in death and procuring the aid of a
physician to assist in committing suicide during the final stage of life. 65
The court answered that under the Constitution no distinction can be
drawn between refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment and physician-
assisted suicide.66
The district court also addressed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim.67
-The plaintiffs asserted that the Washington law made an unconstitutional
distinction between two similarly situated groups of mentally competent,
terminally ill adults.68 The court summarized the argument by stating
that:
Under current state law, those terminally ill persons whose con-
dition involves the use of life-sustaining equipment may lawfully
obtain medical assistance in terminating such treatment, includ-
ing food and water, and thereby hasten death, while those who
also suffer from terminal illness, but whose treatment does not
involve the use of life support systems, are denied the option of
hastening death with medical assistance.69
The court found that the two groups of terminally ill adults were simi-
larly situated and held the law "unconstitutional because it violates the
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibit-
ing physician-assisted suicide while permitting the refusal or withdrawal
of life support systems for terminally ill individuals."7 The court held
that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause and also held that Washington's law violated a protected Four-




67. Id at 1466-67.
68. Id. at 1466.
69. Id (footnote omitted).
70. Id at 1467.
71. Id
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This decision was appealed,72 and in March 1995, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court.73 The
court cited several reasons for its reversal, including the district court's
misinterpretation or misapplication of existing law,74 the court's failure to
consider the State's interests,7 5 and failure to address the classic "slippery
slope" argument.76
The court of appeals accused the district court of quoting Casey out of
context and opined that doing so led to an unsound result.77 The appel-
late court reasoned that by relying on the language quoted from Casey,
the lower court's ruling could not be limited to terminally ill persons: 78
If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is this uncurtailable ability to believe and to act on
one's deepest beliefs about life, the right to suicide and the right
to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of at least every sane
adult. The attempt to restrict such rights to the terminally ill is
illusory. If such liberty exists in this context, as Casey asserted
in the context of reproductive rights, every man and woman in
the United States must enjoy it.79
The court of appeals also expressed concern that the district court's
decision lacked support in recent precedent and in our nation's tradi-
72. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.), reh'g, en banc, granted,
62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
73. Id. at 594. "The conclusion of the district court that the statute deprived the plain-
tiffs of a liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and denied them equal protec-
tion of the laws cannot be sustained." Idt at 590.
74. Id. at 590.
75. 1d at 591.
76. Id. at 593-94.
77. Id. at 590-91.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 591. The appeals court is correct in this regard. The right to assisted suicide
cannot be limited solely to terminally ill adults-all adults must enjoy the same rights. The
court of appeals expressed concern that "[t]he depressed twenty-one year old, the romanti-
cally-devastated twenty-eight year old, [and] the alcoholic forty-year old ... [might] also
assert[ ] their personal liberty." Id. at 590-91. However, this would be their prerogative.
One may feel sympathy or empathy for these individuals, but this does not mean one per-
son has the right to interfere with another person's liberty. The fact that someone is de-
spondent does not mean they automatically forfeit their constitutional rights. Remember
that doctors do not have to assist in a suicide. Doctors frequently choose to refuse patient
requests for elective treatment or surgery that the physician feels is unnecessary. If a phy-
sician so desired, he or she could ask the patient to consult a psychiatrist before prescribing
a fatal dose of medication. Some guidelines would surely be required for the protection of
patients and physicians, but that is not the focus of this Comment-the only concern here
is whether the right to assisted suicide exists, not how to regulate the exercise of this right.
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tions.80 According to the court, during the existence of our country no
constitutional right to assisted suicide "has ever been asserted and upheld
by a court of final jurisdiction.... [A] federal court should not invent a
constitutional right unknown to the past ... ."81 The court of appeals
concluded that while they do have compassion for those who are suffer-
ing, "[c]ompassion cannot be the compass of a federal judge. ' 'a2 Rather,
"[tihat compass is the Constitution of the United States.""3
The soundness of the court of appeals' criticisms of the district court
can be questioned. First, the district court did recognized that it was
swimming in uncharted waters.' 1 Faced with a lack of precedent, the dis-
trict court should not have been faulted for trying to resolve the case in
the manner they thought best.8 5 More importantly, the appellate court
may have misread the direction that their so-called "constitutional com-
pass" was pointing, as its view of the compass' needle may have been
blurred by predecisional bias. 6 The attorneys for Compassion in Dying,
in appeal to the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, asserted that the author
of the majority opinion, Judge John Noonan, Jr., criticized the district
80. Id, at 591.
81. Id. At this point, the reader should refer back to the language quoted from
Thomas Jefferson in the text accompanying note 1, see Inscription, supra note 1, and with
that in mind, realize that fundamental liberty is not a "constitutional right unknown to the
past." Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. If it were, the Supreme Court would not have
upheld a woman' s constitutional right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
following a history of criminal punishment for abortion, which was subsequently affirmed
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The liberty interest found by the
Supreme Court to support a woman' s right to an abortion is based on creative application
of tested common law and constitutional principles. As exemplified by Roe v. Wade, the
law must be a living, evolving body, that adapts to serve society's needs.
82. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594.
83. Id.
84. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1462 n.5 ("This court is aware of no other
federal cases directly addressing the issue raised in this case.").
85. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,665-66 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
[T]he law, equity and justice must not themselves quail and be helpless in the face
of modem technological marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought of.
Where a [patient], or a parent, or a doctor, or a hospital, or a State seeks the
process and response of a court, it must answer with its most informed conception
of justice in the previously unexplored circumstances presented to it. That is its
obligation ... for the actors and those having an interest in the matter should not
go without [a] remedy.
Id.
86. See Aid-in-Dying Group Appeals in Assisted-Suicide Ruling, AM. MED. NEws,
April 10, 1995, at 11.
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court opinion based upon his well documented anti-abortion beliefs.87
Prior to his appointment to the federal bench, Judge Noonan was a prom-
inent leader in the anti-abortion movement, and is well-known for his
criticism of Supreme Court decisions that uphold the right to abortion.88
The appeal criticized Noonan's opinion as being based upon religion and
morality, and not upon a legitimate state interest.89 In August 1995, the
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit rendered a decision 90 and ordered that
the case be reheard en banc.91 Regardless of the Ninth Circuit's opinion
on rehearing, the losing side will likely appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.' providing the Supreme Court a unique opportunity to
decide the issue of whether there is a constitutionally protected right to
assisted suicide.
B. State v. Kevorkian
In December 1994, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided People v.
Kevorkian,93 a case involving an issue similar to the one in Compassion in
Dying: Whether the State of Michigan's ban on assisted suicide is uncon-
stitutional.94 The court held that "[t]he United States Constitution does
not prohibit a state from imposing criminal penalties on one who assists
another in committing suicide."95
The Supreme Court of Michigan rendered its decision subsequent to
the federal district court's decision in Compassion in Dying, but prior to
the Ninth Circuit's decision in the same case.96 In the course of its analy-
sis, the Michigan court addressed the district court opinion in Compas-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Lawyers for Compassion in Dying argued that "[a]ny distinction made be-
tween dying people on life support and those who are not is based on religion and moral-
ity, not legitimate state interest." Id.
90. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995).
91. Id. Upon the vote of a majority of its 24 nonrecused regular active judges, the
Ninth Circuit decided to refer the case to an 11-judge panel for a new hearing. Court Re-
considers Assisted Suicide Ban, RoCKY MouNTAIN NEws, Aug. 2, 1995, at 25A.
92. See David Cannella. Physician-aided Suicide Fight Rages in Several States: Issue
Expected to Go to Supreme Court, THE ARIz. REPuBLic, May 13, 1995, at A22.
93. 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert denied sub nom. Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct.
1795 (1995).
94. Id at 716.
95. Id.
96. Kevorkian was decided in the Supreme Court of Michigan on December 13, 1994.
Compassion in Dying was decided in the United States District Court, Western District of
Washington, at Seattle on May 3, 1994, and in the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit, on March 9, 1995.
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sion in Dying97 and criticized the district court for many of the same
reasons given subsequently by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.9" The Michigan court disagreed with the federal district
court that either Cruzan or Casey dictates that the United States
Supreme Court would hold that any person, including one who is termi-
nally ill, has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in committing
suicide.99
The Supreme Court of Michigan addressed the "right to die" cases of
Quinlan and Cruzan, and the abortion case of Casey, but refused to apply
the notion of fundamental liberties established by those cases to the area
of assisted suicide. 00 According to the court:
[D]efendant Kevorkian advance[s] several theories why this
Court should find that there is a protected liberty interest in as-
sisted suicide, at least with regard to the terminally ill. All of the
theories, of course, assume a fundamental liberty interest in sui-
cide itself.1°1
An attempt to find a liberty interest in assisted suicide in-
dependent of a liberty interest in suicide itself cannot succeed.
If the due process clause does not encompass a fundamental
right to end one's life, it cannot encompass a right to assistance
in ending one's life." °
The due process clause does, most assuredly, encompass a fundamental
right to end one's life; a "right to die," as established by Quinlan and
Cruzan. Therefore, following the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Michigan, the due process clause can encompass a right to assistance in
ending one's life. Recall Justice Rehnquist's statement in Cruzan that the
Court "assume[s] that the United States Constitution would grant a com-
petent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydra-
tion and nutrition."' 3 The district court in Compassion in Dying
correctly interpreted Justice Rehnquist's statement by noting that,
"squarely faced with the issue, the Supreme Court would reaffirm Justice
Rehnquist's tentative conclusion in Cruzan that a competent person has a
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, even
97. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 727-33.
98. See id. at 728-33.
99. Id at 728. "Those who assert such a right misapprehend the nature of the holdings
in those cases." Id
100. Id at 724-27.
101. Id at 726.
102. Id. at 726 n.35.
103. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
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when that treatment is life-sustaining and refusal or withdrawal of the treat-
ment would mean certain death."'1 4
C. Prior Moral and Legal Arguments Have Failed to Establish a
Constitutional Right to Assisted Suicide
The moral and legal arguments based on privacy and individual liberty
offered to date in support of an individual's right to assisted suicide have
not been successful in the courts.105 However, as evidenced by the fed-
eral district court decision in Compassion in Dying, at least some judges
appear willing to recognize that "laws and institutions must go hand in
hand with the progress of the human mind,' 0 6 and to judicially grant
individuals the right to assisted suicide. Although, as exemplified by the
federal appellate court's decision in Compassion in Dying and the
Supreme Court of Michigan's decision in Kevorkian, many judges are not
so willing to take this action.
Liberty is not the only constitutional grant that may provide a basis to
argue for a right to assisted suicide. Perhaps if the plaintiffs' attorneys in
those previous cases had attempted an alternative argument in support of
assisted suicide-specifically, that one's own body is one's property and
that the rights of property ownership should attach to the human body-
the courts may have been willing to find a right to assisted suicide in the
United States Constitution. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution not only grant liberty rights to individuals,
but property rights as well.107 The Fifth Amendment states, "No person
shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."' 08 While the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government,
a similar restriction on the deprivation of one's property rights is imposed
upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 09 Therefore, a constitu-
tional property-based argument may be the key to successfully upholding
a person's right to assisted suicide.
104. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461 (emphasis added).
105. "It is not likely that our era will be judged as one which fostered the growth of
individual liberty." RUSSELL ScorT, Tim BODY AS PROPERTY 248 (1981).
106. See Inscription, supra note 1.
107. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF
ASSISTED SUICIDE: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE HUMAN BODY
A. Definitions of Property
In defining "property," Black's Law Dictionary states:
The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and
interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and ex-
clusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every
legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude every one else
from interfering with it. That dominion or indefinite right of use
or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular
things or subjects. The exclusive right of possessing, enjoying,
and disposing of a thing. The highest right a man can have to
anything.110
Stephen Munzer, an author who has written on property rights in the
body, states, "'Property rights,' as generally understood, form a bundle
that includes claim-rights to possess, use, manage, and receive income;
powers to transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon; liberties to consume or
destroy; and immunity from expropriation without compensation.""'
According to Jan Narveson, another author in the field of self-ownership,
"The essence of 'property' ... is that it is a right to determine, insofar as
one can, what happens to that which is said to be one's property."' 2
These definitions encompass a broad range of rights; they refer gener-
ally to "things," which no doubt include both real and personal prop-
erty. 113 But questions remain. Does the term "property" include the
human body? May people rightly view their body parts or their whole
bodies as their personal property? Do people own themselves?"' Is
there self-ownership such that people may do with their own bodies as
they want? And if there is self-ownership, do people have a property
right to commit suicide (liberties to consume or destroy"15), and for that
matter, do they have the right to obtain assistance in doing so (assisted
110. BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
111. Stephen R. Munzer, Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts, 6 CAN. J. L. & Jupts.
319, 320 (1993) (citing S. MIJNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22-25 (1990)).
112. Jan Narveson, Self-Ownership and the Ethics of Suicide, 13(4) SUIclDE & Lirn-
THREATENING BEHAv. 240, 247 (1983).
113. See Biagi, supra note 47, at 447 (citing R. CUNNINGHAm, W. STOEBUCK ET AL.,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.2, at 3 (1984)) ("Property rights concern the legally protected
interests that people have with respect to 'things.' ").
114. See Narveson, supra note 112, at 247.
115. See Munzer, supra note 111, at 320.
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suicide), or even to have others do so for them (voluntary active
euthanasia)?
B. Analysis of the Body as Property: Do People Own Themselves?
To answer the above questions, one must undertake both a moral and a
legal analysis.' 16 As will be made apparent, a moral analysis yields a pos-
itive answer to the above questions and results in the finding that people
do indeed own their bodies and do have a moral right to do with them as
they please-including the right commit suicide, to obtain assistance in
doing so, and to have others do so for them. A legal analysis yields a
similar answer, but a thorough legal analysis is difficult given that attor-
neys have not yet put forth property-based arguments on the issue of
assisted suicide, thereby failing to give courts the impetus to find legal
property rights in the human body.
Commentators and philosophers differ as to how the above questions
should be answered. Much of the commentary and analysis of the body
as property is in the area of body parts or organ donation.117 However,
the same moral and legal arguments that support property rights in body
parts apply equally to the body as a whole.118 This leads to the logical
conclusion that people own their bodies as a whole unit and may dispose
of them as they please, including by means of suicide, assisted suicide, or
voluntary active euthanasia. Even if one does not agree that the legal
arguments apply equally to whole bodies as they do to body parts, "[a]t a
moral level ownership gives one certain rights and allows one to make
certain claims, whether or not they are supported in law." '19
1. Moral Analysis of the Body as Property
a. Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant, the eighteenth century German philosopher, asserted
116. See Narveson, supra note 112, at 247.
117. See generally Scorr, supra note 105 (spare body parts, organs and tissues, organ
donation, and body ownership); see also Biagi, supra note 47, at 448-50 (cadavers, organ
donation, donation of replenishable body parts); Randy W. Marusyk & Margaret S. Swain,
A Question of Property Rights in the Human Body, 21 OrrAWA L. REv. 351, 352 (1989)
(human tissue and bodily substances); Munzer, supra note 111, at 321 ("The context is one
in which the chief issue is whether parts of the human body can be given away or sold.").
118. Munzer asserts that "[b]ody parts differ in many ways from whole bodies," Mun-
zer, supra note 111, at 322, but in the context of a discussion of suicide and assisted suicide,
with a view of the body as property, this statement simply is not correct. All the same
property rights that attach to body parts also attach to whole bodies.
119. LAW, HEALTH & MEDICAL REGULATION, supra note 28, at 37.
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that there are no property rights in body parts. 20 According to Kant,
"[a] 'human being'... is not entitled to sell his limbs for money, even if he
were offered ten thousand thalers for a single finger.' 12 1 Kant reasoned,
"If he were so entitled, he could sell all his [or her] limbs."'" Kant's
beliefs derive from the notion that human beings have a free will.'23
However, if a human being does indeed have a free will, then surely he or
she has a moral right to "sell all his [or her] limbs." What is the notion of
a free will if it does not include the freedom (the moral right) to do as one
pleases with his or her body, including the freedom to sell one's limbs?
In regards to prostitution, Kant asserted that:
To let one's person out on hire and to surrender it to another for
the satisfaction of his sexual desire in return for money is the
depth of infamy. The underlying moral principle is that man is
not his own property and cannot do with his body what he
will.
12 4
This passage and the statements regarding the sale of one's limbs exem-
plify Kant's view that it would be "'self-contradictory' to be both the
owner and the object of ownership."z According to Kant, "'a person
cannot be a property and so cannot be a thing which can be owned, for it
is impossible to be a person and a thing, the proprietor and the prop-
erty.""' 26 It may be argued, in response to Kant, that the notion of a free
will includes the freedom (the moral right) to view ourselves as "a thing,"
to view ourselves as our own property, and to sell ourselves for others'
sexual gratification should we so desire.127
120. Munzer, supra note 111, at 321-22.
121. Id at 319 (citing IMMAMNEL KANT, LECrURES ON ETHics [1775-80] 124 (L. Infield
trans., 1963) [hereinafter KANT'S LEcrtuRFs]).
122. Id. at 323.
123. See id. at 323. Kant states, "We can dispose of things which have no freedom but
not of a being which has a free will. A man who sells himself makes himself a thing and, as
he has jettisoned his person, it is open to anyone to deal with him as he pleases." Id (citing
KANT'S LECrtURS at 124).
124. l (citing KANT'S LEcruRES at 165-66).
125. Id (citing KANT'S LEcruRES at 165).
126. Id- (citing KANT's LEcrumRS at 165).
127. If one is to recognize the moral right to sell one's limbs, one must be prepared to
recognize a moral right to sell one's body for others' sexual gratification. A moral right to
do one necessarily includes a moral right to do the other. Indeed, the argument that peo-
ple own their bodies and that they have the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and
disposing of their bodies, and that they have the liberties to consume or destroy their bod-
ies, supports the moral right to sell their limbs, to sell their bodies for others' sexual gratifi-
cation, to commit suicide, and even to consume mind altering substances, despite the legal
ramifications.
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Strong disagreement may be taken with Kant's views, and it appears
much of American society does disagree. Today, Americans widely rec-
ognize property rights in the human body, and indeed, find it both mor-
ally and legally acceptable to view the body as property, at least in some
circumstances. For example, the current state of organ donation in the
United States allows individuals to make anatomical gifts upon death.
The right to make such gifts, and the right to transfer such property, rec-
ognizes property rights in the human body.
Science, medicine, and the law have advanced to a point where it is
possible to make anatomical gifts. Surgeons have the scientific knowl-
edge, medical technology, skills, and tools to harvest organs from one
body and successfully transplant the organs into another body, often
greatly extending the lifespan of the recipient. State legislatures, in re-
sponse to these scientific and technological advances, have enacted legis-
lation allowing such transfers of body parts." American society has
advanced to a point where many people recognize the value of such med-
ical technology, and therefore, are willing to make their bodies and the
bodies of their loved ones available for use in lifesaving transplants. Had
Kant realized 220 years ago that organ donation would someday be
widely utilized to save human lives, he may have had a different view on
property rights in the human body.
This Comment argues, in opposition to Kant, that there are property
rights in body parts. If there is a moral and legal right to donate a body
part, it involves a choice to transfer, and hence, is a property right in the
body as defined above.'2 9 From this proposition flows the argument that
there are property rights in whole bodies as well;' 30 that people do indeed
128. In 1968, the National Conference on Uniform Laws adopted the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act in an attempt to rectify the legal problems involved with organ donation,
and thereby increase the number of organs available for transplantation. Biagi, supra note
47, at 448 n.121. Under the UAGA, an individual may make a gift of body parts or the
whole body to take effect after death. Md at 448-49. By 1971, all 50 states and the District
of Columbia had adopted the UAGA. I& (citing C. Levy, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE
LAw: LnoAL & ETHiCAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN ExPERIMENTATION 59-63 (2d ed.
1983)). The UAGA addresses the issue of consent to postmortem anatomical gifts, but
does not address the issue of consent to transplantation by living donors. Id. at 449 n.122
(citing Comment, Regulating the "Gift of Life"--The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
65 WASH. L. REv. 171, 177 (1990)). A kidney is the only vital organ currently capable of
transplantation from a live donor. Id. (citing Levy, supra). But other body parts that living
donors may donate include bone marrow, blood, and skin. Id.
129. See Munzer, supra note 111, at 321.
130. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (arguing that there are property rights
in whole bodies).
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own themselves, and therefore, have a moral right to do with their bodies
as they please. This moral property right includes the right to terminate
one's existence prior to when it would otherwise end and to obtain assist-
ance in doing so.
b. John Locke
The line of thought on self-ownership, as it relates to the moral status
of suicide, stems from the individualist tradition of property rights.' 3' Ac-
cording to this view, persons are their own property."3 2 John Locke, the
seventeenth century English philosopher, claimed that "'every man has a
property in his own person. This, nobody has any right to but him-
self." 1 33 Locke made this statement in relation to the performance of
labor and the products or fruits of one's labor."M However, this Com-
ment, like Jan Narveson's writings, ventures to extend Locke's proclama-
tion to suicide and actually proceeds even further than Narveson's
writings to extend Locke's proclamation to assisted suicide.
Jan Narveson, in the individualist tradition, aptly argues that:
[T]here is no important distinction between things that are es-
sential parts of myself [Le., body parts], so that it would be
strictly impossible to give them to others or to destroy them
without thereby destroying myself as well, and things that are so
inessential that I would see no difference between life with them
and life without them [i.e., other personal property]. There is no
essential distinction regarding what it is for them to be my prop-
erty. But there is a difference of fundamentality. Were I not the
owner of my mind, and in many cases of my bodily parts, the
whole idea of external property would be superfluous and un-
definable. 'It's yours, but you can't do anything with it!' is silly
talk.
Accordingly, it seems to me that the idea of self-ownership is
coherent. Indeed, one may reasonably argue that the whole
idea of ownership of anything presupposes the idea of owner-
ship of oneself. If that is true, then at least self-ownership is as
coherent as property ownership in general.1"'
As previously stated, the essence of property rights is that the posses-
131. Narveson, supra note 112, at 247.
132. I&
133. Id.
134. See idU at 248, 249; see also LAw, HEALTH & MEDICAL REGULATION, supra note
28, at 46 (labor puts a value on everything).
135. Narveson, supra note 112, at 249 (footnote omitted).
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sor has the right to determine what happens to those things that are said
to be his or her property.136 Narveson correctly observes that because
people have the right to do as they wish with their own property, it fol-
lows that people also have the right to do as they wish with their own
life-including terminating it by conmmitting suicide.137 Narveson points
out, however, that Locke would reject such an argument.Y38 Narveson
writes:
Locke, of course, was notorious for holding the belief that we do
not have the right to destroy ourselves. But then, he seems to
have thought that because he thought we were all the property
of God, when you get right down to it. Would he have held that
God had the the [sic] right to destroy us? Probably. 39
Therefore, it appears from Narveson's interpretation of Locke's writ-
ings that Locke tied the right to destroy property to ownership of that
property. Locke envisioned property rights in the same way as they are
articulated in this Comment. That is, because human beings are all the
property of God, according to Locke, only God can rightfully destroy
US.1
4 0
Law and rationality both agree with Locke that the right to destroy
property is tied to ownership of that property. However, one may per-
missibly disagree with Locke's position that people are the property of
God. This statement is not intended to anger those who hold strong reli-
gious beliefs, and it is understandable that many people equate one's reli-
gion with one's moral code. However, the focus of this Comment is not
on the topic of religious morality. 141 This Comment argues that one may
have an individual moral code that operates in conjunction with one's
religious beliefs, yet does not strictly follow "antiquated" religious teach-
ings.' 42 This Comment maintains that people are the owners of them-
selves, and with this comes the right to consume or destroy oneself.
Locke argued that the rights of one person are necessarily constrained
136. Id. at 247.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 249-50.
140. See id.
141. For a discussion of the morality of suicide and assisted suicide analyzed from the
differing religious perspectives of Reform Judaism and Roman Catholicism, see Alvin J.
Reins, Reform Judaism, Bioethics, and Abortion, J. REFORM JuDAisM at 44-48 (1990).
142. See All's Well That Ends Well, supra note 6, at 307 (pertinent language quoted
supra note 18).
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by the rights of other 1ersons. 43 If all people have the moral right to the
use of their bodies, it follows that no one has the moral right to use their
body in such a way as to interfere with others' use of their bodies.'"
Narveson writes that:
Each person has ... an enormous repertoire of possible ac-
tions available to him or her. That is simply the way we are.
Now, the hypothesis of freedom is that selection among these
actions is to be done by the person whose repertoire it is. Limi-
tations from the outside are to be imposed only in the interest of
the like liberty of others. Suicide is on the list. It does not, in
the absence of special arrangements, appear to interfere with
that 'like liberty' of others. Thus, we would seem to have a
prima facie case for the legitimacy of suicide. 4 '
While this Comment is substantially in agreement with Narveson' s ar-
gument, Narveson stops short of a logical conclusion. Munzer defines
property rights to include "powers to transfer... [and] liberties to con-
sume or destroy, 4 6 According to Narveson, one has the moral right to
do as one wishes with one's property-including the right to do as one
wishes with one's body (e.g., commit suicide).' 4 7 Accordingly, one also
has the "power to transfer" the "liberties to consume or destroy" to an-
other to exercise on one's behalf. Thus, if people have the moral right to
commit suicide, they also have the moral right to seek assistance in com-
mitting suicide, or for that matter, to request that it be done for them
(voluntary active euthanasia).
Suppose, for example, that one develops a fondness for the sound of
breaking glass and purchases a large quantity of fine china specifically for
the purpose of shattering it on his or her kitchen floor. To an outsider
this may appear irrational and even ludicrous. However, the person with
the fetish has purchased the property rights to break the fine china, and
these rights include "powers to transfer ... [and] liberties to consume or
destroy."'48 As long as the exercise of these property rights does not in-
terfere with any other person's exercise of their own property rights, or
endanger the safety of others, it is morally (and legally) acceptable for
one to purchase and break all the fine china he or she wishes. In addi-
tion, because property rights include powers to transfer, the fetishist may
143. Narveson, supra note 112, at 248.
144. Id.
145. Id at 250.
146. Munzer, supra note 111, at 320 (emphasis added).
147. Narveson, supra note 112, at 247.
148. Munzer, supra note-111, at 320 (emphasis added).
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give the china to an acquaintance on the condition that the other assist
him in breaking the china, or on the condition that the acquaintance
break the dishes for him while he sits on his sofa drinking a glass of chi-
anti, simply for the fetishist's auditory enjoyment.
This argument is an extension of the assertions offered by Locke and
Narveson. Locke claims that everyone has a property right in one's own
person.149 Narveson argues that because one has the right to do as he or
she wishes with his or her own property, it follows that one also has the
right to do as he or she wishes with one's own life-including terminating
it by committing suicide."' This leads to the logical conclusion that be-
cause one has property rights in their own body, and may morally commit
suicide, there is no reason to prevent the full exercise of those moral
property rights, including the "powers to transfer... [and the] liberties to
consume or destroy,"'5' and to thereby obtain assistance in one's own
suicide.
2. Legal Analysis of the Body as Property
a. The United States Constitution
1. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
The mandates of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 52 as they ap-
ply to property, appear to indicate that no person can be deprived of any
of the rights that attach to the ownership of property without due process
of law, including the right to transfer and the right to consume or destroy.
If, as argued above, the body is property, then each time a person wishes
to destroy his or her property by committing suicide, or wishes to transfer
the right to destroy his or her property by seeking assistance in commit-
ting suicide, then that person cannot be deprived of such property rights
without due process of law.
One might argue that the separation of the words "life" and "property"
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would go against the notion of
treating the body as property for the purposes of suicide and assisted sui-
cide. However, in committing suicide or assisted suicide, one is not exer-
cising his or her right to life; rather, one is exercising a "right to die."
The right to life applies to situations of capital punishment, and this is*
149. Narveson, supra note 112, at 247.
150. Id. Narveson points out, however, that Locke would reject such an argument. Id
at 247, 249-50.
151. Munzer, supra note 111, at 320 (emphasis added).
152. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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what the drafters had in mind when the provision was written.153 How-
ever, the "right to die" was not specifically addressed by the drafters and
was only later established through the case law as a liberty right.'54 As
has been explained above; courts are unwilling to apply the right to die
encompassed by the liberty interest found in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the situation of suicide and assisted suicide.155 There-
fore, this "right to die," as applied to suicide and assisted suicide, would
best be protected and extended through a view of the body as property.
2. The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."' 56
The Thirteenth Amendment appears to grant property rights in the
human body. 5 7 Because the Thirteenth Amendment expressly prohibits
153. See A. C. Pritchard, Government Promises and Due Process: An Economic Analy-
sis of the "New Property", 77 VA. L. Rtv. 1053, 1055 (1991). According to Pritchard:
The United States Constitution provides that "no person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The pre-constitutional un-
derstanding of the scope of these rights derived from the Magna Carta and the
English common law tradition, as embodied in the writings of Sir Edward Coke
and Sir William Blackstone: "life" refers to the physical existence that capital pun-
ishment terminates; "liberty" is freedom from bodily restraint; "property" refers
to possession, both real and personal.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
154. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976) (comatose patient has a privacy right grounded in the federal constitu-
tion to be free from bodily invasion by further treatment (a respirator), the right is not
diminished by mental incompetency, and the patient's father may refuse such treatment on
her behalf); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990)
("Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by
a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue is
more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.") (citing
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986)).
155. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[N]o
constitutional right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of
final jurisdiction.... [A] federal court should not invent a constitutional right unknown to
the past and antithetical to the defense of human life.... ."); see also People v. Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d 714,728 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 1795
(1995) ("We disagree ... that the Supreme Court would find that any persons, including
the terminally ill, have a liberty interest in suicide that is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
156. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
157. See id.; see also Biagi, supra note 47, at 452 (explaining how the Thirteenth
Amendment supports property rights in one's own body).
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slavery and involuntary servitude,15 at first glance it would appear to
deny the availability of any property interest in the human body.159
However, the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment could be con-
strued as supporting one's right of exclusive control over their own physi-
cal being, in which case, the Thirteenth Amendment is consistent with the
existence of property rights in one's own body.160
Although the notion that one person may be owned by another violates
our sense of human dignity, a significant difference exists between owner-
ship in the context of slavery and a person's ownership rights with respect
to his or her own body.' 61 "While slavery abolishes one's personal auton-
omy, exclusive control over one's own body enhances personal autonomy
and privacy."'6" Therefore, in more than one place, the United States
Constitution seems to support the right to commit suicide and assisted
suicide through a view of the body as property.
b. Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Clarification
or Confusion?
In 1988, the California Court of Appeal decided Moore v. Regents of
the University of California ("Moore F'),163 in which the court found
property rights in human body parts in the context of an action for con-
version."64 The case involved the defendant's "non-consensual use of the
plaintiff's cancerous spleen cells to develop pharmaceutical products of
enormous commercial value.' 165
The issue in Moore I was whether the plaintiff had personal property
fights in the tissue and substances of his body and, if so, whether these
fights were violated when the defendants used his tissue for commercial
158. U.S. CON T. amend. XIII; Biagi, supra note 47, at 452.
159. Biagi, supra note 47, at 452.
160. Id. (citing Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property
Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207,224-25 (1986)).
161. Id. at 433.
162. Id. at 433 n.4 (citing Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a
Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL. REv. 179, 192 (1988)).
163. 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. App. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
164. Id. at 505. "The rights of dominion over one's own body, and the interests one has
therein, are recognized in many cases. These rights and interests are so akin to property
interests that it would be a subterfuge to call them something else." Id. "The essence of a
property interest-the ultimate right of control-therefore exists with regard to one's own
human body." Id. at 506. This was the first decision to conclusively establish that one
holds property rights in one's own body. Marusyk & Swain, supra note 117, at 354.
165. Marusyk & Swain, supra note 117, at 352.
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gain.'66 The plaintiff, John Moore, asserted a right to a portion of the
financial rewards from the new pharmaceutical products that had been
developed through the use of his cancerous spleen cells.' 67 The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning that Moore owned his cancerous
cells and continued to own them even after his spleenectomy. 168 The
court found that the defendants had converted Moore's personal prop-
erty by creating a cell-line therefrom using recombinant DNA technol-
ogy.' 69 The court held that the plaintiff had property rights in his body
for the purposes of a conversion action. 7 ' Following this decision, prop-
erty rights were recognized to exist in body parts.' 7 1
The defendants then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of
California ("Moore I/').172 The Supreme Court of California reversed
the holding that Moore could maintain a cause of action for conversion,
and held instead that Moore could assert a cause of action against his
physicians for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent.'" 3
The court in Moore II denied Moore any property rights in the patented
cell-line that had been derived from his tissues. 74
The court did not, however, expressly deny that there are property
rights in the human body.'"5 Instead, the court simply declined to apply
the common law tort of conversion to the facts of this case.' 7 6 In fact, the
court noted that there may be purposes for which there are property
rights in excised cells.'" The court wrote, "While we do not purport to
hold that excised cells can never be property for any purpose whatsoever,
the novelty of Moore's claim demands express consideration of the poli-
166. Id.
167. LAW, HEALTH & MEDICAL REoULATION, supra note 28, at 48.
168. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505 ("Plaintiff's spleen, which contained certain cells, was
something over which plaintiff enjoyed the unrestricted right to use, control and disposi-
tion."); Marusyk & Swain, supra note 117, at 354.
169. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 510 ("Any use to which there was no consent, or which is
not within the accepted understanding of the patient, is a conversion."); Marusyk & Swain,
supra note 117, at 354.
170. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07. "Even though the rights and interests one has
over one's own body may be subject to important limitations because of public health
concerns, the absence of unlimited or unrestricted dominion and control does not negate
the existence of a property right for the purpose of a conversion action." Id.
171. Marusyk & Swain, supra note 117, at 370 (property rights exist in human tissue).
172. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
173. Ida at 497; Biagi, supra note 47, at 434.
174. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497.
175. I4 at 493.
176. Id.
177. Id
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cies to be served by extending liability."' 78
Although the court in Moore II correctly extended protection to- the
plaintiff under the doctrine of informed consent, this protection is no sub-
stitute for the protection provided by property interests in one's own tis-
sues.179 The recognition of one's right to participate in the commercial
development of his or her tissues, and to share in the financial rewards
therefrom, is supported by current property rights theories, and would
further the right of personal autonomy that is the thrust of the informed
consent doctrine.'8 0 The court in Moore II should also have allowed
Moore to maintain an action for conversion.
In Moore II, the court asserted that because Moore had no expectation
of retaining possession of his cells following their removal, he could not
maintain an action for conversion unless he had retained an ownership
interest in them.' This assertion, however, is based upon an erroneous
assumption." Although Moore may not have expected to have actual
physical possession of his spleen following the surgery, "he did expect to
have constructive possession through the right to control the disposition
of his tissues."'1 3 In fact, the physicians and researchers led Moore to
believe he had the right to control the disposition of his tissues through
their use of consent forms.' 8 4
Initially, John Moore had signed a written consent form authorizing the
splenectomy.', However, the physicians and researchers actively con-
cealed from Moore their intentions to use his cells for research and to
profit therefrom.'86 During one follow-up visit, the physicians extracted
tissue from Moore and presented him with a consent form to allow them
to engage in research, which he signed.' 7 At that point, John Moore
surely must have believed that by signing the consent form he had the
right to control the disposition of his tissues. On a different occasion,
Moore again had tissue extracted, to which he consented; however, this
time he expressly denied defendants the right to do further research-"s
178. ItL
179. Biagi, supra note 47, at 456.
180. d (citation omitted).
181. Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-89.
182. See Biagi, supra note 47, at 458.
183. 1&
184. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01; Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
185. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
186. Id.
187. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01.
188. Id. at 501.
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In spite of this express lack of consent, the physicians continued their
exploitation of Moore's cells. 189 As stated in Moore I, "[a]ny use to
which there was no consent, or which is not within the accepted under-
standing of the patient, is a conversion." 190
It has been aptly stated that the Moore II decision is "contrary to com-
mon law and statutory recognition of property rights in the body, and is
offensive to societal values of equality and fundamental fairness."'' It is
difficult to comprehend how Moore can be denied property rights and
cannot affirmatively claim his own financial interest in his bodily tissues,
particularly when the very same tissues are considered by the court to be
the property of another.19
Under traditional common law principles, the right of a patient to con-
trol the future use of his surgically removed organ or tissues is protected
by the law of conversion. 93 Generally, the tort of conversion protects
one not only from interference with the right of possession of one's prop-
erty, but also protects against unauthorized use of one's property or im-
proper interference with one's right to control the use of one's
property. 94
The majority opinion in Moore II failed to recognize that a patient gen-
erally has the right to determine, prior to removal of a body part, how the
part will be used after removal.195 Moreover, the majority failed to iden-
tify authority that indicates to the contrary.'9 6 The most closely related
189. Id
190. Id. at 510.
191. Biagi, supra note 47, at 435 (footnotes omitted).
192. Id (footnote omitted); see also Moore, 249 Cal. App. at 507 ("Defendants' posi-
tion that plaintiff cannot own his tissue, but that they can, is fraught with irony.... We
cannot reconcile defendant's assertion of what appears to be their property interest in re-
moved tissue and the resulting cell-line with their contention that the source of the mate-
rial has no rights therein.").
193. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 502 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
194. Id. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Moore 11, Justice
Broussard wrote:
Sections 227 and 228 of the Restatement Second of Torts specifically provide in
this regard that "[o]ne who uses a chattel in a manner which is a serious violation
of the right of another to control its use is subject to liability to the other for
conversion" and that "[o]ne who is authorized to make a particular use of a chat-
tel, and uses it in a manner exceeding the authorization, is subject to liability for
conversion to another whose right to control the use of the chattel is thereby
seriously violated."
Id.
195. Id. at 501 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id
It's My Body and I'll Die If I Want To
statutory scheme in effect in California at the time of Moore I and Moore
II, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"), 197 makes it clear that a
patient does have a right to determine post-removal use of a body part.198
Although the UAGA only applies to postmortem anatomical gifts, the
general rule of "donor control" is "clearly not limited to that setting.' 99
According to Justice Broussard, who concurred in part and dissented in
part in Moore II:
In the transplantation context, for example, it is common for a
living donor to designate the specific donee-often a relative-
who is to receive a donated organ. If a hospital, after removing
an organ from such a donor, decided on its own to give the or-
gan to a different donee, no one would deny that the hospital
had violated the legal right of the donor by its unauthorized use
of the donated organ. Accordingly, it is clear under California
law that a patient has the right, prior to the removal of an organ,
to control the use to which the organ will be put after
removal.200
Property rights under the UAGA include the right to control the dispo-
sition of one's body after death, but not the right to transfer, for financial
gain, body parts that will be used for transplantation.2 °0 The imminent
lifesaving capabilities of organ transplantation account for the general
contempt for a market-based system of organ acquisition. 20 2 However,
the prohibition on sales of organs apparently does not apply to the sale of
bodily tissues used for research or commercial purposes.20 3 Because the
companies that are developing biological products operate at a profit, do-
nation of tissues for commercial purposes warrants compensation to the
donors.2° If researchers have an intention to profit from research using
another's body parts, it is only fair that the person be informed of such an
intention and be compensated for his or her consensual participation. If
John Moore had not been faced with secrecy and deception on the part of
his physicians, and they had fully informed him of their intentions, he
could have legally released all property rights in the excised cancerous
197. See supra note 128 (discussing the UAGA).
198. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 501 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
199. Id. at 502.
200. Id.
201. Biagi, supra note 47, at 449.
202. Id. at 449 n.124.
203. Id. (citing CAL. HEALT & SAFET'Y CODE § 7155 (Deering 1990)).
204. Id (citing generally Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the University
of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499 (1990)).
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spleen cells through monetary compensation.2 °5
Moore II incorrectly failed to affirm the extension of the tort of conver-
sion to John Moore's allegations. Property rights do exist in body parts
and whole bodies, and the Supreme Court of California erroneously re-
versed the holding of Moore I that John Moore held property rights in his
body for the purposes of a conversion action.
3. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health2 °6 deserves one
more brief comment in the context of a legal analysis of the body as prop-
erty. In its introductory discussion, the Supreme Court addressed the
genesis of the informed consent doctrine.20 7 It appears from their discus-
sion that the informed consent doctrine grew not only out of the common
law torts of assault and battery, but also out of a view of the body as
property, or a view that some of the rights that we normally associate
with property also attach to one's own body.2 °8 The Court wrote that:
Before the turn of the century, this Court observed that "[n]o
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interfer-
ence of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law." 2
09
The Court also stated that Justice Cardozo, while on the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, aptly described the doctrine of informed consent as
the right of "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind... to
determine what shall be done with his own body.''210 So, perhaps the doc-
trine of informed consent, as applied by the court in Moore II, does not
preclude the application of the tort of conversion because it would appear
that both conversion and'informed consent grew out of the rights to con-
trol the use and disposition of one's property.
205. See iii at 449 n.124 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155 (Deering 1990)).
206. 497 U.S 261 (1990).
207. Id at 269.
208. Id
209. Id (citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (emphasis
added).
210. Id (citing Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)) (empha-
sis added).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Many more individuals-human beings with compassionate loved ones
who care deeply for them-will likely die agonizing, painful, and humili-
ating deaths before friends, family, and physicians will be able to assist
them in ending their interminable suffering without experiencing legal or
professional sanctions. Some courts appear willing to help, but do not
believe they have the legal basis to do so. Attorneys must give the courts
new arguments upon which to decide these types of cases, or else the
courts will not be able to show proper compassion for suffering individu-
als. Voters appear ready to support the individual's right to choose death
over life, but when they do, as in Oregon, courts are questioning the con-
stitutionality of the action and are not upholding the will of the people.
The actions of state legislatures are mixed. While some legislatures are
introducing legislation to permit assisted suicide, others are enacting laws
specifically prohibiting assisted suicide. With such uncertainty, lobbying
initiatives directed at district representatives may not provide the entire
solution.
The solution to this problem lies in the development of a sound legal
and moral argument to support an individual's right to choose death over
life. The success of this argument, both in the courts and in the legisla-
tures, depends on its ties to tested legal principles. Historically, property
rights have provided people the power to do what they want with what is
their own. A property-based argument provides suffering people the
legal and moral ammunition to exercise their rights to commit suicide and
to have others assist them in doing so.
Roger F. Friedman-
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